Banking crises are recurrent phenomena, often induced by ex-ante excessive bank risk-taking, which may be due to behavioral reasons (overoptimistic banks neglecting risks) and to agency problems between bank shareholders with debt-holders and taxpayers (banks understand high risktaking). We test whether US banks' stock returns in the 2007-08 crisis are related to bank insiders' sale of their own bank shares in the period prior to 2006:Q2 (the peak and reversal in real estate prices). We find that top-five executives' ex-ante sales of shares predicts the cross-section of banks returns during the crisis; interestingly, effects are insignificant for independent directors' and other officers' sale of shares. Moreover, the top-five executives' significant impact is stronger for banks with higher ex-ante exposure to the real estate bubble, where an increase of one standard deviation of insider sales is associated with a 13.33 percentage point drop in stock returns during the crisis period. The informational content of bank insider trading before the crisis suggests that insiders understood the risk-taking in their banks, which has important implications for theory, public policy and the understanding of crises.
Introduction
In 2007-2008 the United States was overwhelmed by a financial (notably banking) crisis, which was followed by a severe economic recession. Banking crises are recurrent phenomena and often trigger deep and long-lasting recessions (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009 ). Importantly, banking crises are not exogenous events, but regularly come after periods of strong bank credit growth and risk-taking, especially associated to real-estate bubbles (Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor, 2015; Kindleberger, 1978; Schularick and Taylor, 2012) . The recent crisis was not different, and hence banks also took high risk in the run-up of the bubble (Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter, 2010; Brunnermeier, 2009; Calomiris, 2009; Rajan, 2010) .
A key question for policy and for the academic literature is why banks take on so much risk. There are two (not mutually-exclusive) views. First, the moral hazard view (see, e.g., Admati and Hellwig, 2013; Allen and Gale, 2007; Freixas and Rochet, 2008) implies that agency problems mainly between bank shareholders with bank debt-holders and taxpayers due to excessive bank leverage and the explicit and implicit bank guarantees (such as deposit insurance, central bank liquidity and bail-outs) make rational for banks to take on excessive risk. Consistent with this view, bankers understand risks and it is optimal for them to take on high risks. Moreover, bankers' incentives are affected by bonuses, which typically are tied to short-term profits rather than to the long-term profitability of their bets (Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter, 2010) . Therefore, bank insiders such as CEO, CFO or Chairman of the board contribute to the standard agency problem when acting on behalf of shareholders, but also when acting on their own interest and, in this case, against the interests of shareholders, bondholders and taxpayers. 1 Note that agency problems are at the heart of modern corporate finance theories (see, e.g., Myers, 1977; Tirole, 2006) , but for banks, agency problems may be more important than for non-financial firms due to the large bank leverage and the strong explicit and implicit bank guarantees. Second, the behavioral view states that banks take on high risk because for example they neglect unlikely tail risks and have over-optimistic beliefs (Akerlof and Shiller, 2010; Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2012; Kahneman, 2011) . 2 In the limit case of this view, banks were not aware of 1 In the case of insider trading by executives we are in the presence of an additional conflict of interest to the one mentioned before between bank shareholder and bank debt-holders and taxpayers. Given the ability to trade on their own account (sell), bank executives may choose banks risk exposure which is not optimal even for shareholders. 2 A related argument is based on the idea that given the long-term upward trend in house prices, their excessive risk-taking prior to the crisis.
Though the 2007-08 financial crisis greatly affected the banking system (average bank returns were very poor during the crisis), there was substantial bank heterogeneity in performance (some banks even failed) as high risk-taking was not uniform across banks (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012) . If bank insiders understood the risks they were taking, and risk exposure at the bank level was not reduced, we should find that bank insiders in the riskiest banks (the ones with worse returns during the crisis) as compared to bank insiders in less risky banks should have sold more shares prior to the public bad news in the real estate sector (the peak and posterior reversal in real estate prices that became publicly observed in 2006:Q2). 3 Moreover, this effect should be stronger both with higher bank exposure to the real estate sector prior to the crisis (banks more exposed to the real estate bubble) and with more and better information insiders have (top-five executives such as CEO and CFO versus independent directors and other officers). This is the main hypothesis we test in this paper.
We analyze bank stock returns in the crisis (July 2007-December 2008) based on bank insiders' sales during 2005:Q1-2006:Q1 (before the real estate market peak and reversal in 2006:Q2), controlling for other important bank characteristics. 4 Following Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012) , we set the start of the financial crisis in July 2007 (also due to the problems in the wholesale market in August 2007) and analyze the crisis until December 2008, as Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) argue: "Admittedly, the crisis did not end in December 2008. Bank stocks lost substantial ground in the first quarter of 2009. However, during the period we consider the banking sector suffered losses not observed since the Great Depression. The subsequent losses were at least partly affected by uncertainty about whether banks would be nationalized. Because it is not clear how the impact on bank stocks of the threat of nationalization would be bank executives did not believe that they were taking on excessive risk. Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2012) and Gerardi, Lehnert, Willen, and Sherland (2009) argue that analysts' reports before the downturn show that market participants understood that a fall in house prices would lead to a huge increase in foreclosures, but thought that the probability of this event was very low. Hence, the crisis was a realization of an extreme event; it was just very bad luck. 3 Once the real estate market starts falling, given the quantitative effects on the economy, even insiders in banks with low risk-taking may want to sell their shares due to the feedback effects between the aggregate economy and banks. 4 Pre-crisis bank leverage, size, stock performance and other bank variables for robustness. We define the peak in 2006:Q2, and posterior reversal in the Case-Shiller 20-city composite home price index (see Figure A1 in the Appendix), as the major public event on the real estate market. affected by the incentives of CEOs before the crisis, it could well be that it is better to evaluate returns only until the end of 2008." For robustness, we also analyze other time periods. Implicit in the previous main hypothesis that we test is the assumption that riskier banks did not significantly reduce overall bank risk exposure. Therefore, we also test whether riskier banks reduced their risk-taking (e.g., overall bank leverage and real estate exposure) or their payout policies (e.g., dividends) before the crisis. In a frictionless world without agency problems, we should expect insiders with executive powers in high risky banks (who anticipated that their excessive bank risk would materialize) to decrease risk exposure in general, and to the real estate sector in particular, consistent with their increase in their (insiders) sales, and also reduce payouts to shareholders for precautionary reasons. However, in a world in which conflict of interests (agency problems) prevails, and in the banking sector agency problems are of key importance, or there is a strong bank risk culture (the risk culture hypothesis in Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012) ), or top executives are not powerful enough to change the stated course (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005) , such reaction at the bank level may not take place. Hence, either because managers do not have an incentive to deviate and reduce risk and dividends, or because managers are unable to influence other executives and directors, top executives may not react at the corporate level but trade on their account pursuing their own personal interests.
Our key variable in this paper is bank insiders' trading, i.e., the selling and buying of shares of their own bank. We obtain the insiders' trades from Thomson Financial Insider Filings database, which provides the detailed information on each trade by insiders and the roles of insiders in their firm. Based on their roles and their differential access to private information about bank operations, we classify insiders into three categories: top-five executives (such as CEO, CFO and other top-executives), middle-officers and independent directors. 5 We follow the approach suggested in the insider trading literature to set up our empirical strategy. The primary focus of the literature is to investigate insiders' use of non-public information in their trades. Since we do not have their private information set or any variable that is perfectly related to it, we follow the literature, 5 It is important to notice that our variable does not include the trading by insiders in instruments related to the underlying risk of the bank, but not issued by the bank (for instance, CDS on subprime indexes) and, consequently, our analysis may underestimate the economic effects of our results. which uses forward-looking variables. To the extent that insiders' trades are also based on private information about their company (not just e.g. simply liquidity needs of the insiders when they sell), these trades will have a predictive power of the future performance of the firm such as the return in the next periods, which suggests that insider trading has informational content on future performance of the firm (as insiders have inside knowledge of the firm that is not perfectly known by the market). 6 Our empirical methodology relies on the same idea. In a crosssectional analysis, we predict crisis period bank returns (2007:Q3-2008:Q4) based on the insider selling measures before the public bad news about the real estate sector in 2006:Q2.
We find that top-five executives' sales of shares in the period prior to the peak and reversal in house prices predict bank performance during the financial crisis. One standard deviation increase in top-five executives' sales predicts a 7.33 percentage point drop in bank crisis period returns. All the results that we present are robust to the inclusion of controls such as the bank characteristics that have been associated to bank crisis performance (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz, 2012; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011) . Bank crisis period returns are buy-and-hold returns from July 2007 to December 2008. In the main analysis we include banks that are delisted during the 2007-08 crisis period, but results are also significant if we only consider banks that survive. 7 The results also hold (become even stronger) when we exclude insiders sales related to options exercise, which clears suspicions on the results being driven by an increase in option-like compensation during the run-up of the real state bubble. In addition, we perform other several robustness checks. For example, we measure bank stock performance over alternative periods (such as January 2007 -December 2008 or July 2007 -September 2008 ; our results are not sensitive to the definition of the crisis period. 8 In addition, we compute several alternative insider trading measures (in changes or in levels, gross or net sales, and in volumes or in number of transactions) and our results are not sensitive to the choice of insider trading measure. All in all, we find robust evidence that top-five 6 The insider trading literature provides evidence on insiders' ability to predict future stock price changes in their own firm stock (see, e.g., Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski, 2012; Huddart, Ke, and Shi, 2007; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Seyhun, 1986 Seyhun, , 1992b . 7 If banks delist or merge prior to December 2008, we put proceeds in a cash account until December 2008 to compute crisis period returns (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz, 2012; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011) . See section 2.2 for the details of the bank performance measure. 8 Interestingly, the insider sales before the peak in real estate prices do not predict the immediate bank returns after the peak in 2006:Q2 and the start of the financial crisis in 2007, but only predict bank returns during the financial crisis. executives' sales of shares predict on average significant worse bank performance during the crisis.
If bank insiders understood the risks they were taking, not only should we find that bank insiders in the riskier banks should sell more shares, but effects should be stronger both with higher bank exposure to the real estate sector prior to the crisis and with better information insiders have. We indeed find that the effects are insignificant for independent directors' and middle-officers' sale of sharesopposite to top-five executives in which the estimated coefficient is strong both statistically and economically. Moreover, we also find that the impact of ex-ante top-five executives' sales on worse crisis performance is stronger for banks with higher ex-ante exposure to the real estate sector. In particular, for banks with real estate exposure higher than the average, we find that an increase of one standard deviation of insider sales leads to a 13.33 percentage point drop in stock returns during the crisis period, which is approximately half the average of the 28% drop in bank returns over the crisis for all the banks in our sample.
Finally, we further investigate the link between bank insiders' sales before April 2006 and risk-taking (leverage and real estate exposure) and payout policy (dividends) immediately after the real estate price peak. We find no reaction in any of these variables, neither unconditionally in the aggregate, nor conditional on insider sales in the cross-section of banks, which suggests that the insiders of riskier banks (as executives in their banks) did not react differently to the insiders of the other banks in terms of risk taking and payout policy. The documented lack of distinctive reaction may be due to: 1) inertia in the risk measures consideredreducing leverage and real estate exposure takes time given the prevailing contractual arrangements of the banks-and the pervasive signaling implicit in dividend reductions, 2) the prevalence of an equilibrium in which no bank manager has an incentive to unilaterally deviate and reduce risk and dividends, 3) persistency in banks risk culture (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz, 2012) or lack of managerial power (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005) .
In summary, this paper provides robust evidence that insider sales by those bank insiders with access to more precise information on their own bank risk-taking and with executive responsibilities (top-five executives) predict future bank returns during the crisis. The results are consistent with those bank insiders knowing about the high risks their banks were taking (and selling before the crisis).
The main contribution of this paper is the following: there is anecdotal evidence that some insiders of some very few banks that performed badly in the crisis sold a significant part of their shares before the crisis hit; however, there is lack of evidence across the board. Our paper provides sector-wide cross-sectional analysis of the bank insiders' trading just before the peak and reversal in house prices and bank returns during the crisis. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann (2010) provide a case study of compensation in Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers during 2000-2008 and document that both CEO and also top-five executives in these banks significantly sold during this period. 9 A paper close to ours is Cziraki (2015) that analyzes insider trading in US banks around the crisis. This paper finds no differential effects in insider trading in 2005 and bank returns in the crisis, while we find that insider trading before the peak and reversal of real estate prices predicts the cross-section of bank returns during the crisis. The different results are explained by the use of a different sample of banks, choice of insiders and empirical methodology. 10 Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) state that "bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis". But there is no contradiction at all between this statement and the results in this paper. While Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) look at insiders selling activity immediately prior or during the bank crisis (January 2007 to December 2008), we look at insiders selling activity prior to the real estate crisis (2005:Q1 to 2006:Q1). Indeed, in our dataset (that includes the trading of other executives in addition to the CEOs) we also observe a drop in sales immediately prior to the bank crisis. In particular, in robustness checks we document that sales during the period July 2006 to June 2007 (or just January 2007 to July 2007) do not predict bank crisis returns. The relatively low sales by insiders documented in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and the lack of predictability of these sales documented in this paper are both consistent with the theoretical model and empirical results in Marin and Olivier (2008) . In that paper, crashes occur when, after selling large amounts, insiders stop selling. Hence, con- Bhagat and Bolton (2014) . 10 We have double number of banks. Also, Cziraki (2015) divides insiders into three sub-categories such as officers, independent directors and finally looks at only CEOs. But we focus on top-five executives trading including CEO and other top-executives as well. Finally, Cziraki (2015) classifies banks in just two groups (high and low exposure banks) and analyzes the returns of these two groups, while we look at the full cross-section of bank returns. sistent with Marin and Olivier (2008) , in the last banking crisis, there was no bank insider sales immediately before the banks crisis, but there were bank insider sales in anticipation of the real estate crisis that predict the cross section of bank returns during the crisis. Importantly, Cheng, Raina, and Xiong (2014) analyze whether mid-level managers in securitized finance were aware of a large-scale housing bubble and a looming crisis in 2004-2006 using their personal home transaction data. They find that the average person neither timed the market nor were cautious in their home transactions, and did not exhibit awareness of problems in overall housing markets. Their evidence is consistent with behavioral explanations as neglecting risks which fosters house prices and credit expansion, subsequently sparking the crisis Vishny, 2012, 2013). 11 In our paper, we also find that sales by bank middle-officers (or independent directors) were not related to bank returns during the crisis period.
However, we find that top-level executives are very different, especially in banks that were riding the real estate bubble more intensely (i.e., with higher ex-ante real estate exposure). Therefore, our results (top executives in riskier banks sell more their shares before the crisis) are consistent with the agency view of banking crises and have important implications for theory and public policy. First, they contribute to the general theory of corporate finance (see, e.g., Tirole, 2006) and banking (see, e.g., Freixas and Rochet, 2008 ) that are to a great extent based on agency problems, and also to the theory of financial crises (see, e.g., Allen and Gale, 2007) suggesting that agency problems are at the heart of excessive risktaking by banks. Second, our results provide an additional rationale for current policy initiatives on higher bank capital (including Basel III) or macroprudential policies around the world (for a summary, see, Freixas, Laeven, and Peydró, 2015) towards limiting excessive risk-taking by financial institutions. If excessive risktaking were exclusively due to behavioral reasons, then some of the new prudential policies providing better incentives in banks would not matter at all. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the details of data sources, sample construction, and empirical strategy. In section 3, we present and discuss the results and robustness checks. Finally, in section 4 we conclude.
Data and Empirical Strategy
In this section we first explain the data and sample construction, and next, we describe the empirical methodology, including the bank performance and insider trading measures.
Data
The data used in this paper come from several sources. The corporate insider transactions data comes from Thomson Financial Insider Filings Database (TFN) which collects all insider trades reported to the SEC. 12 Accounting data is obtained from Compustat and Tier 1, non-performing loans data are from Compustat Bank. We obtain real estate loans data from FR Y-9 statements from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) Bank Regulatory Database. Price and shares outstanding data come from CRSP Monthly and Daily Stock Files.
Our initial sample is from Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012) . Their sample includes 347 publicly listed US firms from the banking industry. To reduce the noise, we choose the firms in which there was at least one open market sell transaction by any top-five executives in the period of 2005Q1-2006Q1. Our final sample is based on 170 firms with (i) stock return data in CRSP, (ii) financial data in Compustat, and (iii) insider transactions data in Thomson Financial Insider Filings.
The insider trading records that Thomson Financial Insider Filing database provides are the transactions of persons subject to the disclosure requirements of Section 16(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 reported on SEC Forms 3, 4, 5 and 144. The transactions on which we focus come from Form 4 which is filled when insider's ownership position changes. The information includes: name and address of the corporate insider, issuer name of the security, relationship of insider to the issuer (officers, directors or other positions held by insider in the firm), whether it is an acquisition or disposition, the transaction code which describes the nature of the transaction, the transaction date, amount and price. The transaction reported on Form 4 could be any transaction that causes a change in ownership position. Among these transactions, we keep only insiders' open market purchases and sales. 13 All other types of transactions, such as grants and awards or exercise of derivatives, are excluded. 14 Following Lakonishok and Lee (2001) , before merging insider transaction data with other databases, we first identify and eliminate non-meaningful records in insider trading database. We exclude amended records (Amendment Indicator is "A"), filings marked as inaccurate or incomplete by the Thomson database (Cleanse code is "S" or "A"), small transactions where less than 100 shares were traded and also trades for which we do not have the insider's transaction price nor the closing price of the stock. 15 Additionally, some filings in which the reported transaction price is not within 20% of the CRSP closing price on that day or those that involve more than 20% of the number of shares outstanding are eliminated to avoid problematic records.
Depending on their positions in the firm, insiders may have different access to firmspecific information (Lin and Howe, 1990; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005; Ravina and Sapienza, 2010; Seyhun, 1986) . One of the main trader characteristics that Thomson Financial Insider Filings database provides is the role rank (data item is "rolecode") of insiders in their firm. This data item enables us to identify the position of the insider in the bank i.e. officer, director, chairman of the board, large shareholder, etc. Based on their differential access to private information about firm operations, we classify insiders into three categories: top-five executives, officers other than top-five (middle-officers) and independent directors. In our analysis, we mainly focus our attention on the trades of top-five executives, which includes the firm's Chairman of the Board, CEO, CFO, COO and President. 16 This group of insiders has access to better information than insiders in the other categories (Beneish and Vargus, 2002; Core, Guay, Richardson, and Verdi, 2006) . Moreover, we also provide results with middle-officers and independent directors of those firms. 17
Empirical strategy
In the empirical strategy, we follow the approach suggested in the insider trading literature. The primary focus of the literature is to investigate insiders' use of nonpublic information in their trades. Since we do not have their private information set or any variable that is perfectly related to it, we follow the literature, which uses forward-looking variables. To the extent that insiders' trades are also based on private information about their company (not just simply liquidity needs of the insiders when they sell), these trades will have predictive power of the firm future performance, such as the return in the next period. 18 In order to test the relationship between insider selling during the period just before the real estate price peak in 2006:Q2 and firm returns in 2007:Q3-2008:Q4 financial crisis, we perform crosssectional OLS estimation.
Our main regression equation is:
where subscript i denotes the bank, and bank controls are at the end of fiscal year 2004. For simplicity, in the tables we use the variable Sell (change or level) without indicating the exact period in the pre-crisis period.
We now discuss the variables included in the regression equation (1) and interpret summary statistics presented in Table 1 . 19 The dependent variable, Crisis return i , is the annualized buy-and-hold return on bank i stock during the crisis period, which is defined as the period July 2007 to December 2008 (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz, 2012; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011) . 20 If a bank is delisted during the crisis period, we put proceeds into a cash account. 21 Not surprisingly, in our final sample of 170 banks, the average bank return during the crisis period is highly negative, with 28% average loss and 27% median loss (standard deviation is 35%). We compute the banks' crisis period performance for two alternative periods as well. In the first one we take the beginning of the crisis as January 2007 and compute buy-and-hold return from January 2007 to December 2008; in the second, we compute buy-and-hold return for the period July 2007-September 2008. 22 The summary statistics of these two stock performance measures that are computed over alternative periods of crisis indicate negative bank performance, similar to our main performance measure, with the median bank returns of -24% in the January 2007-December 2008 and -18% in the July 2007 -September 2008 The other main variable of interest in equation (1) is the insider trading measure, ∆Sell i . 24 The literature defines several measures for insider trading. The number of insiders who did a transaction in a given period, the number of shares sold (purchased) in a period, the dollar value of sell (purchase), the number of transactions (or separately the number of sell/buy transactions) are the most common ones. We follow Marin and Olivier (2008) and use the dollar value of sell transactions nor- 19 In Table A2 in the Appendix we report summary statistics of other variables used in robustness tests. 20 For each bank, buy-and-hold return is computed as the product of one plus each month return, minus one. Monthly returns are directly obtained from CRSP Monthly Stock File. 21 If banks delist or merge prior to December 2008, we put proceeds in a cash account until December 2008 (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz, 2012; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011) . In order to deal with delisting month return, we do the following: For the banks that were delisted due to bankruptcy we replaced return in the delisting month with -1. In other delisting cases such as merger we keep the return reported in CRSP in the delisting month. In case the return in the delisting month is missing we incorporate delisting return if it is available in CRSP. 22 We follow Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2012) to decide on the alternative crisis periods. The first measure includes the beginning of 2007 as it has been argued that the very first signals of the crisis were observed in the first half of 2007 and the second measure excludes the 2008:Q4 in order to eliminate the effect of government intervention. 23 See Table A2 in the Appendix for the summary statistics of stock performance measures computed over alternative periods. 24 Our main measure of insider selling activity in anticipation of the burst of the real estate bubble is in changes as the dependent variable is the change in stock prices (returns). But, for robustness, we also use the level of sales (Selli). malized by market capitalization as our leading measure of insider trading. In each bank, first we go through all open market sell transactions held in each day during the period 2005:Q1-2006:Q1 and compute the value of each transaction (number of shares sold × transaction price) and divide it by the market capitalization on the transaction day. 25 Then we sum the value of sell transactions at the bank-insider sub-group level. Market capitalization is calculated by multiplying the bank share price by the number of shares outstanding that is obtained from CRSP daily stock file. In the main analysis, we use two different variables: (1) ∆Sell i , the total value of sell transactions during the period 2005:Q1-2006:Q1 (before the peak of real estate prices in 2006:Q2) minus the sales in the preceding 12 months, which for simplicity we refer to as 2004, and (2) Sell i , the total value of sell transactions during the period 2005:Q1-2006:Q1. 26 These two variables are our main variables of interest and our aim is to analyse the relationship between these two main insider trading measures and bank return in the financial crisis.
The first variable of interest is ∆Sell i . The mean of this variable, 0.04, indicates that on average top-five executives sold 0.04 (as a percentage of market capitalization) more in the anticipating period (2005:Q1-2006:Q1) as compared to 2004. Moreover, out of the 170 banks in our sample, 120 banks have a positive value for ∆Sell i , thus implying that we observe an increase in selling in 71% of our sample of banks. The second insider trading variable of interest is the Sell i which is just the sum of the value of each sell transaction (after adjusting it by market capitalization on the transaction day) that was held during 2005:Q1-2006:Q1. Median bank top-five executives sold in total 0.12% of the company during the sample period. The average is 0.29% and the standard deviation is 0.43%. 27 [ Table 1 about here.]
In robustness analysis, we include more insider trading measures. 28 For instance, we compute the change in the number of sell transactions, ∆#Sell i , as well as 25 The period 2005:Q1-2006:Q1 refers to the period of January 3rd 2005 to March 31st 2006. 26 For computational details of the variables see Table A1 in the Appendix. 27 We also compute our main insider trading measures (∆Selli and Selli) using the middleofficers' and independent directors' transactions. If we compare median sell value across the three groups, we observe that top-five executives selling transactions are substantially higher than those of the other two groups. The median sell for independent directors is 0.03% and for middle-officers is 0.04%, whereas top-five executives sold 0.12% as we mentioned above. 28 See Table A1 for computational details and Table A2 in the Appendix for the summary statistics of these alternative insider trading measures. the number of sell transactions, #Sell i in the anticipating period. Summary statistics show that median #Sell i is 3 in 2005:Q1-2006:Q1 and the difference in the number of sell transactions (as compared to 2004) is 1. Additionally, we compute net sell value, N etSell i , instead of raw sell by subtracting the total value of insider purchases from sales and also change in net sell value, ∆N etSell i . The summary statistics of net sell value are close to raw sell value, thus indicating that the volume of buy transactions is very low. After subtracting the total value of buy transactions, median sell represents 0.11% of the company and the average sell is 0.26%.
In our analysis, we include several control variables following both the insider trading literature and the recent literature on financial crises. All the control variables are at the end of fiscal year 2004. Our sample of banks has an average of $33 billion in assets, its large standard deviation indicates large variation in terms of size, and the median bank has $2.2 billion in asset. For the total liabilities, the median value is $1.98 billion and the average is $30 billion. The market capitalization of the median bank is $429 million whereas the mean is $5 billion. The median book-to-market ratio is 0.48. The average buy-and-hold stock return of our sample banks from January to December 2004 is 16%. As a measure of bank riskiness, we obtain its beta from weekly market model of daily returns from January 2002 to December 2004, where the market is represented by value-weighted CRSP index obtained from CRSP daily data. The average beta is 0.79, with a standard deviation of 0.48. Both the mean and the median bank leverage ratios are above 60%. The median bank distributes 0.38% of its total assets as dividends, whereas the average is 0.42% and the standard deviation is 0.29%. Real estate exposure of each bank is measured by the loans backed by real estate as of 2004 (adjusted by total assets). The median (also the mean) bank has 48% of its total assets in real estate loans.
We also perform heterogeneous analysis on equation (1). If bank insiders understood the risks they were taking, not only should we find that bank insiders in the riskiest banks (the ones with worse returns during the crisis) should have sold more shares prior to the public bad news in the real estate sector (the peak and posterior reversal in real estate prices), but this effect should be stronger the higher the bank exposure to the real estate sector prior to the crisis (i.e., in banks more exposed to the real estate bubble) and also the more information insiders have (top-five executives such as CEO and CFO versus independent directors and middle-officers). Therefore, we also analyse equation (1) only for the banks with exposure to real estate sector in 2004 higher (and lower) than the median. Moreover, we analyze sales (∆Sell i and Sell i ) not only for top-five executives, but also in other regressions, for middle-officers and for independent directors. Finally, we analyze in a cross-section analysis whether the insiders' sale of shares in 2005:Q1-2006:Q1 lead to different bank risk measures in the following period.
Results
This section presents and discusses the main results of the paper. We start by analyzing the impact of the top-five executives' sale of their own bank shares on bank returns during the crisis. Column 1 of Table 2 presents results from cross-sectional regressions of bank returns in the financial crisis on top-five executives sell transactions, with our main variable ∆Sell i , which measures the change in insider sales before the peak and reversal in house prices (2005:Q1-2006:Q1) with respect to the previous year in 2004. That is, we analyse the change in stock prices of banks during the crisis period with ex-ante change in insider trading. The coefficient is negative (-0.163***) and statistically significant at the 1% level. 29 The estimated coefficient implies that an increase in one standard deviation of the insider trading measure reduces bank returns in the crisis by 7.33 percentage point.
[ Table 2 about here.]
In column 2 to 4, we find similar coefficients of ex-ante insider trading on bank crisis returns when we add different bank controls (as of end of 2004). Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) document a negative relationship between bank crisis period performance and bank characteristics such as return, book-to-market and size as of 2006. We find the same results with a larger sample. Return in 2004 has a negative coefficient, thus suggesting that banks with relatively higher returns in 2004 performed relatively worse in the financial crisis. Book-to-market has statistically significant negative coefficient as well. Market capitalization has also a significant negative coefficient, thus suggesting that larger banks experienced lower returns in the crisis. Bank equity beta and leverage are statistically insignificant.
In columns 5 through 8 of Table 2 we present the results with our second measure of insider trading, Sell i , which measures the level of insider trading before the peak and reversal in house prices (2005:Q1-2006:Q1). Columns 5 to 8 show that the increase in insider sales predicts a lower bank return in the crisis period. Results are both statistically and economically significant. In addition, the control variables have the same signs as in the previous columns. Overall, our results in Table 2 show that banks in which top-five executives sold more shares before the real estate price peak (both in raw value and compared to 2004) performed significantly worse during the 2007-08 crisis period. Table 3 shows the results from cross-sectional regressions of annualized buy-andhold returns from July 2007 to December 2008 on insider trading measure (as in Table 2 ), but across two group of banks depending on their real estate exposure. We divide the banks into two groups by the median value of the real estate exposure at the end of fiscal year 2004. For our main insider trading variable, columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 show results for banks with high real estate exposure measure (real estate exposure measure higher than the median value) and columns 3-4 show results for banks with low real estate exposure (the measure below the median). Columns 5 to 8 do the same for our second insider trading measure.
[ Table 3 about here.]
Our findings are only statistically and economically significant for banks with a higher level of real estate exposure. In column 1, the coefficient on top-five executives' sale is negative (-0.303***) and statistically significant at the 1% level. In terms of economic magnitude, the effect is stronger than the average bank in Table 2 . An increase of one standard deviation of the insider sales measure leads to 13.33 percentage point drop in stock returns during the crisis period, which is approximately half of the average of 28% negative bank returns over the crisis for all the banks in our sample (see also Table 1 ). Finally, results in columns 2, 5 and 6 are similar -i.e., for banks with high real estate exposure, there are statistical and economic significance -but there are insignificant effects for bank with low real estate exposure (columns 3, 4, 7, and 8). All in all, the top-five significant impact (that we find in Table 2 ) is stronger for banks with higher ex-ante exposure to the real estate bubble.
In Table 4 we explore the relationship between insider sales before real estate price peak and reversal and crisis period bank returns across different insider groups depending on their level of information about the bank. We re-run the regression that we report in Table 2 but using independent directors instead of top-five executives (column 3 and 4 of Table 4 ) and middle-officers' trades instead of top-five executives (column 5 and 6 of Table 4 ). To facilitate comparisons, Column 1 and 2 of Table 4 are identical to column 1 and 4 in Table 2 as we use in here top-five executives' sales.
[ Results are only statistically and economically significant for top-five executives. For example, columns 1, 3 and 5 have the following estimated coefficients for insider sales: -0.163***, 0.026, and 0.007, respectively. For the sake of space, we use in Table 4 our main measure of insider trading, but we find identical results (unreported) if we use our second measure of insider trading on the level of insider sales (i.e., results are only significant for top-five executives).
That is, in Table 4 , we wanted to understand further heterogeneous effects of the main hypothesis tested in this paper. If bank insiders understood the risks they were taking, not only should we find that bank insiders in the riskier banks should sell more shares, but effects should be stronger the higher the information insiders have. And we indeed find that the effects are insignificant for independent directors' and middle-officers' sale of shares -opposite to top-five executives, in which the estimated coefficient is strong statistically and economically speaking.
We perform several robustness tests. For example, in Table 5 we do a placebo test analyzing the impact of top-five executives' sales on bank returns during the period immediately after the peak in real estate prices and before the beginning of the crisis (2006:Q2-2006:Q4) . Results on top-five executives' trading are insignificant.
[ Table 5 about here.]
In the Appendix we report many other robustness checks. 30 In Table A3 , we analyze whether the result is driven or not by trading related to options exercise. We find that when we exclude all sales related to options exercise, the results are even stronger with the relevant coefficient going from -0.163***(all sales) to -0.192*** (only sales not related to options exercise). On the other hand, columns 5 to 8 show that sales related to options exercise are not predictive of the cross-section of bank crisis returns. 31 In Table A4 , we test for the sensitivity of our results to alternative crisis period definitions. The crisis period is either defined as January 2007 to December 2008 or as July 2007 to September 2008. We compute the buy-and-hold return of each bank stock for these two alternative periods and replicate our main result in Table 2 . The results remain very similar.
In Table A5 , we use four alternative measures of insider trading for robustness. Columns 1 and 2 use the difference in the number of sell transactions between 2005:Q1-2006:Q1 and 2004; similarly, columns 3 and 4 present results with the raw number of transactions instead of volume. As in the benchmark regressions with the volume of insider trading sales, we find similar results with the number of transactions by insiders. Moreover, in robustness we also use net value of sales instead of sales. Columns 5 and 6 present results with the difference in the net value of sales between the period 2005:Q1-2006:Q1 and 2004, and columns 7 and 8 use the net value of sales in 2005:Q1-2006:Q1. We find as well similar results as in the benchmark regressions with volume of sales (Table 2) .
In Table A6 , and also for robustness, we replicate our main result in Table 2 with other bank controls and for different samples of banks. In all columns, we observe that our main finding of insider trading on bank returns during the crisis is robust to all the new control variables and different samples of banks. Columns 1-5 present results using the full sample of 170 banks. First, following Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012) in column 1 we replace our leverage measure with market-based leverage measure of Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) , and in columns 2 and 3 we replace leverage with tangible common equity (TCE) ratio and Tier 1 capital ratio, respectively. 32 Similar to Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012) , the coefficient on leverage is negative and statistically significant at 1% level, thus indicating that highly levered banks as of 2004 performed worse in the crisis. We find positive and statistically significant coefficient on Tier 1 capital ratio, but the coefficient on tangible common equity ratio is not statistically significant. These results are also consistent with Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz 31 Thomson Financial Insider Filings database provides a data field which gives information whether the sale transaction is related to an option exercise. In this exercise, we eliminate all sales transactions with the data field optionsell "A" or "P", which stand for all, and partial, respectively. 32 Note that column 1 of Table A5 replicates column 4 of our main analysis in Table 2 by replacing the leverage measure with Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) measure. (2012) . 33 Finally in columns 4 and 5, we control for non-performing loans and liquidity, respectively. The coefficients on these two additional control variables are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Furthermore, in columns 6-10 we replicate the analysis we do in columns 1-5 with the sub-sample of 125 bank holding companies that file Y-9 reports with the Federal Reserve in 2004. In terms of both the sign and significance, we find similar results for all new control variables. The only exception is leverage in column 6. The leverage measure of Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) has a negative coefficient but it is not statistically significant in this sub-sample. Importantly, in all columns, we observe that our main finding is robust to all these new control variables. Finally, as a final robustness check, we replicate our main analysis with only the banks that survived until December 2008. In Table A7 , we rerun our analysis after excluding the banks that are delisted during July 2007-December 2008. Results are very similar.
In Table A8 , we report the results when using insider sales during the 12-month period immediately prior to the bank crisis (sales for the period July 2006 to June 2007). Consistent with Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and Marin and Olivier (2008) , we find that bank insider sales immediately before the crisis do not predict the cross-section of bank crisis returns.
Finally, in Table 6 we analyze whether differential insider trading before the peak and reversal in real estate prices implies different bank risk taking in the period after the peak in real estate prices. We test whether riskier banks reduce their risk exposure (overall bank leverage and real estate exposure) or their payout (dividends) before the crisis, in particular as of end of 2006 in Table 6 .
As stated in the introduction, in a frictionless world without agency problems, we should expect insiders (who anticipated the real estate crash) with executive powers in high risk banks to decrease risk exposure to the real estate sector in particular, and perhaps also to reduce bank risk exposure in general, consistent with the increase in their (insiders) sales. Furthermore, and along the same lines, we should also expect those insiders to reduce dividend payments to shareholders for precautionary reasons. However, in a world in which conflict of interests (moral hazard) prevail, and in the banking sector these agency problems are of key importance, 33 Both Stulz (2011) and Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and document a positive relationship between Tier 1 capital ratio as of 2006 and bank crisis period performance. Additionally, Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012) includes tangible common equity ratio in the equation, but similar to us, there is not a significant relationship between tangible common equity ratio and bank crisis period performance. such reaction at the bank level may not take place.
[ Table 6 about here.]
We find no reaction in any of the bank variables (leverage, real estate exposure and dividends) in 2006, neither unconditionally in the aggregate, nor conditional on insider sales in the cross-section of banks, which means that the insiders of riskier banks as compared to the insiders of the other banks reacted similarly in terms of bank risk taking and payout policy. We find very similar results in Table A9 for bank risk measures in 2007 and, in Table A10 , for different groups of insiders. As stated in the introduction, the documented lack of distinctive reaction may be due to inertia in the risk measures considered -as reducing leverage and real estate exposure takes time given the prevailing contractual arrangements of the banksand the pervasive signaling implicit in dividend reductions, or to the prevalence of an equilibrium in which no bank manager has an incentive to unilaterally deviate and reduce risk and dividends.
Conclusion
Agency problems are at the heart of modern corporate finance theories (for example, see Myers, 1977; Tirole, 2006) . For banks, agency problems may be more important than for non-financial firms due to excessive bank leverage and the explicit and implicit bank guarantees such as deposit insurance, central bank liquidity and bail-outs (see Admati and Hellwig, 2013; Allen and Gale, 2007; Freixas and Rochet, 2008) . Therefore, bankers may take rationally excessive risk due to incentives rather than just pure behavioral reasons such as over-optimism and neglecting tail risks.
One empirical way to analyze these issues is to document what insiders were doing before the crisis. In an influential paper, Cheng, Raina, and Xiong (2014) -analyzing mid-level managers in securitized finance using their personal home transaction data from 2004-2006 -find that the average person neither timed the market nor were cautious in their home transactions, and did not exhibit awareness of problems in overall housing markets, which make the authors to conclude that behavioral reasons were crucial.
We analyze instead insiders of banks. In particular, we test whether US banks' performance in the 2007-08 crisis is related to bank insiders' sale of their own bank shares in the period prior to the peak and reversal in house prices in 2006:Q2. We find robust evidence that top-five executives' ex-ante sale of their own bank shares predicts worse bank returns during the crisis. Interestingly, effects are insignificant for independent directors' and middle-officers' sales of shares (which is consistent with the middle-managers of Cheng, Raina, and Xiong (2014)). That is, effects are substantially stronger for the insiders with the highest and better level of information, the top-five executives. Moreover, we find that the top-five executives' significant impact is stronger for banks with higher ex-ante exposure to the real estate market (i.e., banks more exposed to the real estate bubble). An increase of one standard deviation of top-five executive sales leads to a 13.33 percentage point drop in stock returns during the crisis period, which is approximately half of the overall reduction in bank stock returns during the crisis. All in all, given the informational content of bank insider trading before overall real estate problems, our results suggest that insiders understood the large risk-taking in their banks, they were not simply overoptimistic, and hence the insiders in the riskier banks sold more before the crisis.
These results have not only implications for corporate finance or banking theory based on agency problems, as we also discuss in the Introduction, but also for the understanding of financial crises and public policy -especially on the recent prudential policy measures across both sides of the Atlantic. Our evidence is consistent with agency problems in the banking industry being important in driving risk-taking and, therefore, the recent policy initiatives on higher bank capital (including Basel III) or macroprudential policies around the world (Freixas, Laeven, and Peydró, 2015; Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina Salas, 2016 ) may be useful for limiting excessive bank risk-taking. If high risk-taking in banks were exclusively due to behavioral reasons, then some of the new prudential policies providing better incentives for bankers would not matter at all. Moreover, our results may also yield policy implications for the insider trading regulation in banking institutions. The ability to trade by insiders (selling shares of their own bank when they anticipate that their excessive risk-taking may materialize) may exacerbate conflicts of interest. Banning trading by bank insiders may endogenously result in lower excessive risk-taking by banks and operate as a (partial) substitute for bank capital regulation or macroprudential policies. However, banning trading by bank insiders on these grounds would not be fully justified as there are many other costs and benefits involved that should be accounted for. We leave these questions for future research. 
(3) The ratio of equity book value to equity market value.
Equity book value(ceq)
Equity market value × 100 Market value of common equity is defined as prcc f × csho where prcc f is the close price for the fiscal year and csho is the common shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year.
Compustat

Dividend
The ratio of total dividends (common and preferred) to total assets. × 100
Compustat Leverage
The ratio of long term debt and debt in current liabilities to stockholders' equity, long term debt and debt in current liabilities.
Long term debt(dltt)+Debt in currentliabilities(dlc)
Long term debt(dltt)+Debt in currentliabilities(dlc)+Shareholders equity(seq) × 100
Compustat Leverage Acharya etal. 2010 Quasi-market value of assets divided by the market value of equity.
Asset book value(at)−Equity book value(ceq)+Equity market value Equity market value × 100
Equity market value is defined as prcc f × csho where prcc f is the close price for the fiscal year and csho is the common shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year.
Compustat Liquidity
The ratio of cash to total assets. 
Market value
Equity market value is equal to (prcc f × csho) where prcc f is the close price for the fiscal year and csho is the common shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year(in million$).
Compustat
NPL
Non performing loans is defined as the ratio of non performing loans to total loans (total loans net of total allowance for loan losses).
N on perf orming loans (npat) 
VARIABLES Jan07-Dec08 Jan07-Dec08 July07-Sept08 July07-Sept08 Jan07-Dec08 Jan07-Dec08 July07-Sept08 July07-Sept08 
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